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Abstract 
 
This study builds on structural elaboration theory by developing a model to explain the adoption 
of board structures that appear to conform to the prevailing institutional logic, but that in fact 
contradict it. We test our theory with the case of CEO-only board structures, a formal increase in 
board independence that prior research has shown to lead to greater CEO entrenchment rather 
than increased shareholder value. Using an event history analysis of the Fortune 250 over a 27-
year period, we examine three mechanisms that drive its adoption: executive interests, executive 
power and elaboration opportunities.  We show that the CEO-only structure is more likely to 
occur in firms where a higher proportion of insiders predate the CEO and where the CEO has 
greater formal power and agenda control.  We also find that powerful CEOs are more likely to 
realize the structural change following institutional opportunities like the passage of Sarbanes 
Oxley and organizational contingencies like positive changes in firm performance.  By exploring 
the mechanisms leading to the proliferation of the CEO-only structure, our study contributes to 
socio-political perspectives on corporate governance as well as to theories of institutional logics 
and structural elaboration.  
  
 
 
A key proposition underlying much of corporate governance research, both from agency 
theory and socio-political perspectives, is that inside directors are beholden to the CEO and that a 
greater proportion of inside directors on the board indicates greater CEO power and board 
control (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998; Lynall, Golden & Hillman, 2003; Westphal & Zajac, 
1995).   Underlying this proposition is the idea that outside directors can more capably monitor 
the  CEO’s  activities,  whereas  inside  directors  are  prone  to  capture  and  ill-equipped to contravene 
the  CEO’s  inclinations  (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Winter, 1977; Zajac & Westphal, 1996).  
This view has widely influenced key institutional actors such as public interest groups, 
government regulators, and institutional investors in the United States. Beginning in the 1980s 
and continuing to the present day, these actors have successfully pushed for a decline in the 
number of inside directors on corporate boards (American Law Institute, 1982, Council of 
Institutional Investors, 1989, New York Stock Exchange, 2003). 
The conceptualization of inside directors as pawns of the CEO is part of a broader 
concern with board independence and the rise of the institutional logic of shareholder value 
(Lok, 2010; Shipilov, Greve & Rowley, 2010; Westphal & Graebner, 2010). The shareholder 
value logic is based on agency theory, which holds that the sole purpose of the firm is to 
maximize shareholder value. The object of the board of directors is to ensure that the end of 
shareholder value maximization predominates over executive interests and entrenchment (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). Accordingly, outside directors should hold a 
majority of the  board’s  seats in order to effectively maintain decision control and sanction the 
CEO when needed (cf., Mizruchi, 1983).  Thus the shareholder value logic specifies the 
 
 
relationship between the CEO, insiders and outsiders on the board and the rationale for board 
independence as a mechanism to align the interests and actions of management and shareholders. 
The rise of the shareholder value logic and the concomitant increase in board 
independence has led to a supermajority of outside directors in U.S. corporate boards (Spencer 
Stuart, 2011).  However, less recognized is the rising number of corporations in which the CEO 
is the only insider in the board – what we refer to as the CEO-only structure (c.f., Adams, 
Almeida & Ferreira, 2005).  Although increasingly prevalent, neither agency theory, nor 
regulatory, stock exchange or professional standards call for the CEO-only structure. In fact, 
CEO-only boards have proliferated in direct contravention to calls to separate the CEO and the 
Chairman positions (e.g., Rechner & Dalton, 1991; Brickley, Coles & Jarrell, 1997; Finkelstein, 
Hambrick & Cannella, 2009), which have not been widely heeded (Spencer Stuart, 2011).  
While CEO-only boards may appear to be a natural outgrowth of the pursuit of board 
independence, their increasing prevalence is also somewhat paradoxical.  Recent research by 
both finance and management scholars suggests that the CEO-structure actually increases a 
CEO’s  power and influence. For example, the CEO-only structure leads to diversification 
discounts (Hoechle, Schmid, Walter& Yermak, 2012), monitoring inefficiencies (Liu & Jiraporn, 
2008), and greater CEO influence (Adams et al, 2005).  Unlike other structural and practice 
reforms that were prompted by the shareholder value revolution throughout 1980s and 90s (e.g., 
Davis & Stout, 1992; Davis et al, 1994; Fligtein, 2001; Fligstein & Markowitz, 1993, 
Zuckerman, 2000), these more recent findings provide evidence that CEO-only boards actually 
contradict  agency  theory’s prescriptions by enhancing CEOs’  entrenchment  and  interests.    Given 
evidence that CEOs in U.S. corporations have circumvented the limits on their control imposed 
 
 
by the diffusion of the shareholder value logic through a variety of mechanisms (Davis, 1991; 
Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Westphal, 1998; Westphal & Khanna, 2003; Goldstein, 2012), this 
begs the question: What role has the CEO played in determining the CEO-only board? 
To explain the paradoxical spread of the CEO-only board structure, we draw from and 
extend structural elaboration theory (Edelman, 1992) and apply it to analyze the adoption of the 
CEO-only structure.  In  Edelman’s  (1992)  original  formulation,  the  theory  referenced  how  legal 
mandates were often ambiguous, allowing organizations to adopt formal structures that appeared 
to conform, while designed instead to foster managerial interests.  We extend the theory to the 
context of institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012) 
and argue that institutional logics are also ambiguous with respect to the specifics of formal 
structures, allowing for political processes to shape their structural implementation.  Logics 
create pressure for structural reform, but the precise way that an organization structurally 
responds to this pressure depends on three mechanisms: executive interests, executive power, 
and elaboration opportunities.   
 Executive interests and power, both of which are displayed at the board level, are 
intimately connected in this process.  Powerful organizational elites strategically respond to new 
logics, seeking to adopt structures that ostensibly conform to the logic but that function in 
practice to promote their own interests.  Whereas conventional wisdom on inside directors would 
suggest that the CEO-only structure diverges from CEO interests, we argue that, compared to 
other variants of independent majority structures, the CEO-only structure advances the interests 
of CEOs by conferring an information brokerage position and eliminating potential internal 
contestants for their power and position.  Thus we propose that powerful CEOs strategically 
 
 
respond to institutional pressure for board independence and support the CEO-only structure, an 
elaborated version of board independence.  The third mechanism we propose, elaboration 
opportunities, can occur at either the organization or the institutional level.   Elaboration 
opportunities are events or contingencies that allow organizational elites to leverage their power 
and influence structural change.  Whereas the first two mechanisms help to explain why a 
particular structure proliferates in response to a newly dominant logic, this final mechanism 
helps to explain when structural elaboration is most likely to occur.  Ultimately, the confluence 
of logics, elaboration opportunities, individual interests and power create decision-making 
situations that allow for political activity and instigate processes of structural elaboration. 
Empirically, we test our theory with a study of the adoption of the CEO-only structure by 
Fortune 250 firms from 1981 to 2007.  Throughout this period, the regulatory governance of 
boards went through extreme shifts and the logic of shareholder value became increasingly 
dominant.  From our longitudinal vantage, we are afforded a unique opportunity to observe how 
shifts in institutional environments and organizational contexts interacted with the distribution of 
CEO power to influence the emergence and diffusion of the CEO-only structure. 
Our study offers several contributions.  First, we contribute to the socio-political 
literature on corporate governance (Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Lynall, Golden & Hillman, 2003; 
Combs, Ketchen, Perryman, & Donahue, 2007). We build on prior research establishing that 
governance structures and policies are symbolically manipulated by corporate leaders in order to 
signal conformity with shareholder values while causing minimal disruptions to the actual 
balance of power within the corporation (Fiss & Zajac, 2004, 2006; Porac, Wade & Pollock, 
1999; Westphal & Graebner, 2010). We extend this line of research by challenging conventional 
 
 
wisdom that CEOs will always prefer inside directors to outsiders, showing instead that the 
greater the power of the CEO, the greater likelihood of adoption of a CEO-only structure.  We 
propose that this structure offers CEOs informational brokerage advantages relative to outside 
directors and increases their status and power inside the organization.     
Second, we contribute to the institutional logics literature by highlighting the role of 
power in the elaboration of institutional logics.  While the role of power has been established in 
prior theory and research in institutional logics, it has not been the main focus of this 
conversation (cf. Thornton & Ocasio, 2008).  Prior research has focused on either how 
institutional logics shape the determinants of power (e.g., Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), or how 
competition between alternative institutional logics is shaped by power struggles between 
individual and collective actors (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006; 
Reay & Hinings, 2009). The theoretical and empirical focus of this paper -- how executive power 
shapes structural responses to institutional logics -- has received limited research attention. 
Third,  we  contribute  to  structural  elaboration  theory.    Edelman’s  (1992)  account  of  
elaboration vests structural change in the interaction of regulatory shocks and organizational 
interests.  Her theory proposes that organizations strategically react to regulatory shifts by 
implementing formal structures that further their own interests while signaling conformity to 
institutional expectations.   Our study extends this theory by discussing its application in the 
broader context of institutional logics. Moreover, we draw from socio-political theory to explore 
the intra-organizational political dynamics that undergird the process of structural elaboration.   
THEORY 
 
 
Our theory of board structure and composition combines a socio-political perspective on 
corporate governance with an examination of changes in institutional logics (Zajac & Westphal, 
1996; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Green, Babb, & Alpaslan, 2008).  Institutional logics provide 
historically contingent organizing principles and vocabularies of practice that shape individual 
and organizational values, beliefs, and behavior (Thornton et al., 2012). During the 1980s, a 
logic of shareholder value revolutionized the institutional field of corporate governance 
(Fligstein and Shin, 2007; Greenfield, 2012).   This logic was ideologically rooted in agency 
theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and promoted shareholder wealth 
maximization as the guiding principle for corporate managers and boards of directors.  In light of 
the logic, corporate leaders were urged to take necessary steps to align managerial incentives 
with  the  interests  of  the  firm’s  stakeholders  (Fligstein  and  Shin,  2007).      Organizational theorists 
have  extensively  documented  the  logic’s impact on U.S. corporations throughout this period, as 
it promoted widespread corporate reorganizations, revisions to employment processes, and 
amended governance structures (Davis, 2009; Davis, Diekmann and Tinsley, 1994; Davis and 
Thompson, 1994; Useem, 1993; 1996; Zorn et al., 2005).   The shareholder value logic has also 
shaped corporate governance practices in other countries, but not uniformly so (cf., Fiss and 
Zajac; Lok, 2010; Shipilov et. al., 2010). One particularly ubiquitous change spurred by the logic 
was the rise of board independence, which was prescribed as a mechanism for monitoring the 
CEO  to  assure  that  their  decisions  aligned  with  shareholders’  interests.    At  the  same  time,  
reformers challenged the insider-dominated boards that were characteristic of the previously 
dominant managerial logic by questioning their monitoring capabilities (Mizruchi, 1983; 
Weisbach, 1988).  
 
 
While institutional logics provide the guiding principles for organizational structures and 
practices, they do not provide detailed templates for organizing, but instead allow substantial 
variation in their implementation (Ansari, Fiss, & Zajac, 2010; Lounsbury, 2001, 2008).  Prior 
research has identified both conforming and anomalous practice variation, but has focused 
largely on the latter, holding that anomalous variations lead to changes in institutional logics 
both within and across organizations (Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton et al, 2012).  One exception is 
the study by Shipilov et al. (2010), which studied second wave adoption of board governance 
practices in Canada, following the adoption of the logic (and practices) of board reform.   They 
find that second wave adoption of appropriate forms of variation is positively influenced by firm-
level adoption of practices from the same institutional logics. 
Structural elaboration theory provides a new lens to explain why particular practices are 
developed and adopted in response to new institutional logics.  Structural elaboration theory 
proposes that laws often set forth broad and ambiguous principles, subject to interpretation by 
organizational actors (Edelman, 1992).  Organizations respond to legal requirements by 
elaborating formal structures that serve as visible symbols of compliance, but are not always 
responsive to the intended purposes of the law.  The theory additionally holds that organizational 
interests drive the interpretation of law and lead to variations in the structural forms (formal rules 
and organizational structures) by which the law is implemented.   Specifically, the theory 
contends that organizations strategically react to institutional mandates by searching for 
structural forms that signal compliance but, in practice, protect and promote the interests of 
powerful internal elites.  Structural elaboration theory has been developed and tested primarily in 
the context of Civil Rights Law and the employment relationship (Edelman, 1992; Kalev & 
 
 
Dobbin, 2006: Kmec & Skaggs, 2009), but has not yet been applied to explain variations in 
corporate governance structures or institutional logics. 
Like structural elaboration theory, the institutional logics perspective has highlighted the 
role played by interests in the adoption of organizing practices (Thornton et al, 2012).  But the 
focus of theory and research has been on how power and interests shape competition and rivalry 
among alternative institutional logics (Levy & Scully, 2007; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007;  Reay 
& Hinings, 2009) or how they lead to the transformation and change in logics (Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010; Seo & Creed, 2002).  Structural elaboration theory adds 
to the institutional logics perspective by emphasizing that power and interests can lead to the 
adoption of a particular variant of a practice that apparently reinforce existing logics, yet actually 
work in practice to contradict underlying theoretical principles.    
In this paper, we extend and modify structural elaboration theory by proposing a model to 
explain the adoption of structures that symbolically conform to prevailing institutional logics, but 
in fact, do not.  Our model incorporates three interrelated mechanisms:  executive interests, 
executive power, and elaboration opportunities.  According to our theory, the adoption of formal 
structures and practices that appear to reinforce prevailing institutional logics varies across 
organizations and over time.  We expect the variants that proliferate to be those that align with 
the interests of powerful executives, in our case the CEO (cf., Finkelstein, 1992; Pfeffer, 1981).  
The timing of the adoption of specific variants will be shaped by environmental events and 
organizational contingencies (cf., Zajac, Kraatz & Bresser, 2000).  These create elaboration 
opportunities that increase the likelihood of adoption of structural variants consistent with both 
 
 
the prevailing institutional logics and the interests of powerful executives (cf., Kingdon, 1984; 
March & Olsen, 1976). 
We test our theory via a  longitudinal  analysis  of  U.S.  firms’  adoption  of  the  CEO-only 
insider board structure, a symbolic corporate governance structure that elaborates the shareholder 
value logic in the United States.  Board independence is a guiding principle of the shareholder 
value logic, which propones that independent outside directors are better monitors of firm 
managers and the CEO (American Law Institute, 1982, Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; 
Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990).   While this principle indicates that a majority of the members of the 
board should be outsiders without financial ties to the organization, no further specification is 
universally agreed upon.  This vagueness allows organizations considerable latitude in deciding 
how exactly to implement the principle of board independence. Possible variants in 
implementation include, for example, the separation of the CEO and Chair position (Dalton &  
Kesner, 1987; Westphal & Zajac, 1997),  appointment of lead directors (Sonnenfeld, 2004), fully 
independent audit committees (Coates, 2007), and supermajority outsider boards (Jensen, 1993).  
Although these variants are symbolic manifestations of compliance with the principle of board 
independence, their effectiveness in achieving the intended goal of maximizing shareholder 
value is at best equivocal.  Overall meta-analysis of the effects of board independence on 
financial performance shows lack of consistent effects (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 
1998).  And despite the earlier theoretical support for supermajority outsider boards among 
agency theorists (e.g, Jensen, 1993), empirical support for their superiority is also limited 
(Bhagat & Black, 2001).   
 
 
The CEO-only insider board is itself a variant of supermajority outsider boards.  While 
the selection of insiders vs. outsiders is typically considered a question of board composition 
rather than structure, having the CEO as the only insider on the board alters the formal and 
informal structural relationship between the CEO, other firm executives, and outside directors, in 
ways that other forms of supermajority outsider boards do not.  The CEO-only structure uniquely 
privileges the role of the chief executive in that it creates a structural hole between the 
organization and the board of directors, which the CEO can then fill (Burt, 1992).  By being the 
only insider on the board, the CEO becomes the exclusive formal conduit of information 
between management and the board of directors.  As no other firm executives are peers of 
outside directors as board members, it also reduces the opportunities for informal interactions 
between outside directors and other firm executives. This structural change increases  the  board’s  
dependence  on  the  CEO,  in  turn  augmenting  the  CEOs’  influence  and  perceived  value.   By 
extension, the structure reduces the status and formal power of other senior managers, removing 
them  as  contestants  for  the  CEO’s  power  and  position (Ocasio, 1994).   Therefore, the CEO-only 
structure is critically distinguishable from other forms of independent-majority boards in that it 
qualitatively alters the structural relationships between the CEO, outside directors and other 
senior executives. 
The role of the CEO in fostering the adoption of the CEO-only structure is illustrated by 
Lou Gerstner’s  mobilization  of  power  at  IBM.   When Gerstner became CEO in 1993, the board 
included three other inside directors.  By the start of 1995, only Gerstner remained.  The CEO-
only  structure  remained  intact  at  IBM  throughout  Gestner’s  tenure  and prevailed until 2012, 
when Virginia M. Rometty became CEO, succeeding Sam Palmisetto who remained on the 
 
 
board for one year as Chairman.  According  to  Gerstner’s  own  account,  he  was  concerned  with  
the power of inside directors on the board and mobilized the support of outsiders to reduce the 
size of the board and eliminate all other inside directors (Gerstner, 2002:  75-76):  
“One  of  the  most  revolutionary,  but  least  noticed,  changes  in  the  early  days  involved  the  
Board of Directors.  When I arrived there were eighteen directors, including four 
insiders…I  thought  this  was  an  unwieldy  size  with  too  many  insiders,  particularly  given  
the dominance of current and former employees on the powerful Executive Committee.  
…Clearly  the  CEO  search,  the  media’s  public  flogging of the company, and the sharp, 
extended criticism at the annual meeting had traumatized many members of the board.  I 
quietly approached a few of them, especially Jim Burke and Tom Murphy, for a series of 
discussions  on  corporate  governance…With  my  encouragement,  the  Director’s  
Committee decided it would announce that the board should be reduced in size to make it 
more manageable.  At the same time, we would add new people to bring in some different 
perspectives.  After  the  announcement,  it  didn’t  take anyone more than a minute to 
realize that meant a significant amount of retirements would be in order. …By  the  end  of  
1994, we had a twelve-member board.  I was the only insider. Only eight remained form 
the eighteen who had made up the board just year  before.” 
 
As this account illustrates, Gerstner relied on principles of corporate governance to mobilize 
support for changes in  the  board’s structure and composition, including the adoption of a CEO-
only. In particular, Gerstner’s actions imply that the removal of insiders aligned with his own 
interests in that he was able to remove senior managers that had social capital with outside 
directors (an asset that he, as newcomer to IBM and its board, had yet to develop), and that had 
formal power through membership in the board and its executive committee.  By removing 
powerful executives from the board, Gerstner managed to increase his relative power on the 
 
 
board and eliminate potential contestants for his power and position.  His ability to do so during 
a period of increasing performance indicates an underlying opportunity to advance his interests 
and influence. In what follows, we explore each of these themes in greater detail and develop 
hypotheses for each of the mechanisms driving CEO-only structure adoption. 
 
Hypotheses 
Executive interests. Shifts in institutional logics often compel firms to change their practices or 
structures in order to conform to changing institutional expectations. Structural elaboration 
theory suggests, however, that organizational responses to new institutional demands do not 
always  represent  “a  good  faith  effort  to  comply”  with  the  underlying  impetus  of  an  institutional  
shift (Edelman, 1992: 1567-1568), but are instead often symbolic (Edelman, 2992; Fiss & Zajac, 
2006; Westphal & Zajac, 1994). Understanding why particular structures and practices 
proliferate in response to an institutional shift requires an examination of the interests of the 
actors within organizations (Edelman, 1992; Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, & Hunt, 1998; Kellogg, 
2009).  Edelman (1992) further suggests that organizations respond to institutional shifts by 
adopting formal structures that symbolically comply with new institutional demands but also 
protect the interests of the elites within them.    In light of this, our present effort to explore the 
rise of the CEO-only structure in response to the shareholder value logic begins with an 
assessment of how the structure simultaneously signals compliance with the logic and promotes 
the  CEO’s  interests. 
The CEO-only structure provides an especially strong signal of compliance with the 
shareholder value logic, as it requires the removal of all insiders from the board, aside from the 
 
 
CEO, who are, according to the agency perspective, beholden to CEO interests (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2003; Winter, 1977).   We assert, however, that the CEO-only structure works in 
practice to promote the CEO’s  interests  in  three distinct ways.  Foremost, in the CEO-only board 
structure, the CEO becomes the information broker between the senior executives of the 
corporation and members of the board of directors, providing the CEO with a unique 
informational advantage.  Network scholars have long noted the inherent benefits of a brokerage 
position between two disconnected parties (Burt, 1992; 1997). Brokers may control the diffusion 
of nonredundant information between separate groups and benefit from a disproportionate say in 
whose interests are served when the groups come together.  Potentially, this increases the relative 
dependence  of  outsiders  and  insiders  on  the  CEO  and,  consequently,  the  CEO’s  power  over  both  
parties (Burt, 1997).  In the absence of insiders, the CEO can use the brokerage role to regulate 
the  flow  of  information  on  the  firm’s  financial  and  strategic  issues.    Outside  directors  are  
dependent on the CEO and other top managers for detailed knowledge and information on the 
firm’s  strategy,  operations, and financial performance.  This information is particularly important 
for outside directors, whose time and attention is limited, as their board membership is most 
often a secondary employment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Westphal, 1999).   Insider board 
membership provides outside directors with more direct access to internal information.  Without 
other insiders on the board, outside directors are less likely to be exposed to ideas about the 
firm’s  strategy  and  performance that differ from those of the CEO.  Thus the brokerage position 
afforded by the CEO-only structure is  likely  to  amplify  the  CEO’s  control  over  critical  board  
decisions.    It  is  also  likely  to  increase  the  other  directors’  reliance  on  the  CEO  and  lead  them  to  
view the CEO as more valuable, which is supported by empirical evidence that CEOs within a 
 
 
CEO-only structure are compensated more highly than CEOs on boards with other insiders (Zorn 
et al., 2013).1     
Second, the CEO-only structure increases the  CEO’s  status  and  power  relative to other 
corporate executives.  Boards of directors are elite decision-making groups; board membership 
comes with direct status and power benefits for inside directors (Finkelstein, 1992; Forbes & 
Milliken,  1999;;  Main,  O’Reilly,  &  Wade,  1995).   An insider’s loss of (or inability to secure) a 
board position may affect their reputations outside as well as inside the company.  By being the 
only insider on the board, the CEO is advantaged with a source of power and status that other 
insiders lack, increasing their relative power. 
Third, the CEO-only  structure  removes  contestants  for  the  CEO’s  power  and  position  by  
eliminating potential heirs apparent from the board (Ocasio, 1994; Shen & Cannella, 2002). 
Moreover, the CEO-only structure increases the CEO’s  control  over other  executives’  exposure  
to the board. CEO candidates often gain exposure to the board of directors through board 
membership (Vancil, 1987).  Membership provides outside directors with a chance to see 
executives in action and evaluate their performance in managing the critical issues of the firm 
and to compare them to the CEO.  However, in the case of the CEO-only board,  executive’s  
access  to  the  board  is,  for  the  most  part,  contingent  on  the  CEO’s  granting  them  access.    As a 
result, the  CEO’s  increased  control  over the exposure that other executives have to the board 
                                                        
1 While the present paper is concerned primarily with exploring the antecedents of the CEO-only structure rather 
than its effects, we have also replicated prior studies of how CEO-only structures increases CEO compensation and 
CEO entrenchment with our unique dataset. The results are available from the first author. 
 
 
may shift the dynamics of the succession process to  favor  the  CEO’s  preferences and limit access 
to internal contenders for the CEO position (Ocasio, 1994; Shen and Cannella, 2002).  
Consequently, a CEO-only-insider  structure  may  increase  the  CEO’s  influence  within the CEO 
selection and succession process.   Additionally, by removing the potential for a vetted internal 
heir apparent, the structure makes it more difficult for the board to remove the CEO, increasing 
CEO entrenchment.   
Insofar as the CEO-only structure is perceived by CEOs as being in their interest, 
structural elaboration theory suggests that CEOs should respond to the proliferating shareholder 
value logic by pushing their firms to adopt this structure in symbolic compliance.  Of course, 
while theoretical and empirical evidence demonstrate that the CEO-only structure does 
advantage CEOs, CEOs may not always recognize the CEO-only structure as preferable to a 
simple or supermajority independent board.  Consequently, we contend that the extent to which a 
CEO will be motivated to remove other insiders from the board depends in part on whether the 
CEO  recognizes  other  insiders  as  being  allies  or  contestants.    The  CEO’s  interests  in  adopting  the  
CEO-only structure are thus shaped by variations in the composition of inside directors on the 
board.   
While some inside directors may be staunch allies of the CEO, prior research suggests 
that some insiders may  contest  the  CEO’s  power  (Ocasio,  1994).    Extending  this  notion,  we  
propose that inside directors whose appointments predate the CEO are more likely to be political 
contestants of the CEO than those who postdate the CEO.  Prior work suggests that a CEO is 
more likely to have close ties with inside directors appointed during his or her tenure (Kim & 
Cannella, 2008).  Additionally, a CEO is less likely to be committed to inside directors who were 
 
 
appointed  by  a  predecessor,  and  they  are  less  likely  to  obtain  these  directors’  support,  compared  
to directors who they helped to appoint (Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013).   Predating insiders 
are  also  more  likely  to  have  been  rival  candidates  for  the  CEO’s  position  (cf.,  Vancil,  1987),  
enhancing the likelihood that they are political contestants to the CEO rather than allies.  We 
suggest, therefore, that CEOs are most likely to recognize the CEO-only structure as being in 
their interests when, as in the Gerstner example discussed above, the other insiders on the board 
predate the CEO.  Thus, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the proportion of inside directors appointed prior to the 
selection of the current CEO, the more likely the adoption of a CEO-only board 
structure. 
Executive power.   Structural elaboration theory, with its focus on organization-level outcomes, 
treats  elites’  ability  to  influence  change  as being uniform across populations of organizations.  
However, not all CEOs are uniformly able to influence board structural reform (Zajac and 
Westphal, 1996).  The socio-political perspective suggests that CEOs’ ability to influence their 
organizations depends on the power they exercise relative to other elite constituencies.   As CEO 
power increases, it becomes more likely that the CEO will influence a firm’s board structure and 
composition (Lynall et al., 2003; Westphal & Zajac, 1995).  By grafting structural elaboration 
theory to the socio-political perspective, we propose a more nuanced model of the mechanisms 
driving processes of structural elaboration (Harris et al., 2013).  Our theory diverts from prior 
work in the socio-political tradition, however, by hypothesizing that powerful CEOs may favor a 
structure that eliminates all insiders on the board, rather than increases them.     
 
 
With the proliferation of the agency logic and its demands for enhanced board 
independence over our period of study, insider-dominated boards were no longer an available 
option for corporate CEOs.  Instead, boards were pressured to signal their conformity to the logic 
by having a majority of independent directors.  Within independent majority structures, the CEO 
is less benefitted by having insiders on the board, as the support of outsiders is necessary to 
achieve majority support (Bhagat and Black, 2001).  And, as noted above, the CEO-only 
structure uniquely benefits CEOs by providing them with an information brokerage position and 
limiting contestation from other executives.   Therefore, CEOs responding strategically to the 
shareholder value logic may press for the CEO-only structure as preferable to other variants of 
independent-majority structures.  
Mobilization  of  the  CEO’s  power  in  support  of  the  CEO-only structure is likely to be a 
function  of  the  CEO’s  agenda  control  and  influence  over  the  nominating  process  rather  than of 
an overt conflict with other board members.  Outsiders are likely to side with a powerful CEO in 
favor of the structure because of its consistency with institutional demands for a stricter board.   
While board members are technically nominated by a nominating committee made up of 
independent directors, in reality board membership commonly comes via an invitation from the 
CEO  (Roe,  1994).    This  makes  the  CEO’s  power  and  influence  particularly  important  for  
structural elaboration in the board setting.   
  Following Finkelstein (1992), we consider three aspects of the CEO's power: duality, 
stock ownership, and functional background. CEO duality increases the CEO's agenda and 
information control, shaping which issues the board considers and how it evaluates them. 
Furthermore, because dual CEOs also serve as Board Chair, duality increases the CEO's formal 
 
 
authority over board composition. CEO power also increases with high relative stock ownership, 
which affords greater influence through voting rights (Zald, 1969). If the CEO holds a 
disproportionate percentage of company stock, she reduces the relative provision of resources by 
other directors, alleviates attention given to monitoring by outsiders and advantages her agenda.  
Functional background may also serve as a source of power. In particular, CEOs with a 
finance background are especially situated to provide information to the board that would 
otherwise be provided by the CFO or other key insiders: information on major capital 
investments, financing, and major transactions (Davis, Diekmann, & Tinsley,1994).   Finance 
CEOs are better equipped to answer investor demands for greater disclosure of corporate 
financial information (Matsunaga & Yeung, 2008) and have a greater opportunity to do so in 
absence of CFOs. Correspondingly, a finance background may better orient the CEO towards the 
greater monitoring requirements associated with the shareholder value logic and concomitant 
elaborations in board structure.   In all, we suggest that structural elaborations that conform to 
prevailing institutional logics while enhancing CEO interests are more likely the more powerful 
the CEO.   
Hypothesis 2: The greater the power of the CEO in the board, the more likely the 
adoption of a CEO-only board structure.  
Elaboration opportunities.  In the original development of structural elaboration theory, the 
coercive effects of institutional shocks in the form of new legislation led to the adoption of new 
symbolic structures.  Extending the theory to examine variations in structures that reinforce a 
prevailing institutional logic, we suggest that both environmental events and organizational 
contingencies may trigger opportunities for change (Meyer, 1982; Zajac et al., 2000: Thornton et 
 
 
al, 2012).  These elaboration opportunities moderate the impact of the interest and power 
mechanisms discussed previously.  Specifically, elaboration opportunities trigger increases in the 
power of particular elites within a firm, offering them a window in which to influence structural 
elaboration in accordance with their own interests.  In this way, elaboration opportunities help to 
explain when structural change is most likely to occur in the process of structural elaboration. 
Given limitations on the issues that executives can attend to at any given time, the 
consideration of alternative governance structures is  likely  to  wax  and  wane  in  the  organization’s  
agenda (March & Olsen, 1976; Ocasio, 1997).   Institutional-level  changes  in  an  organization’s  
environment provide elaboration opportunities that shape the timing of the adoption of structural 
variants.  In the context of the shareholder value logic, following the Enron and WorldComm 
scandals, the adoption of Sarbanes Oxley legislation significantly affected the language and 
practice of corporate governance (Gordon, 2007).  The passage of Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) 
triggered a new regime of corporate governance, where board independence received increasing 
board attention.  Soon after SOX, board independence was further promoted when the major 
U.S. stock exchanges all introduced rules requiring listed companies to have a majority of 
independent directors on the board (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007).   In particular, the passage 
of SOX increased the importance of board members with financial expertise who can capably 
monitor corporate financial reports.  The two primary demands of the law -- mandating 
independent audit committees and requiring CEOs and CFOs to personally certify financial 
statements – are intended to foster greater financial scrutiny.  After SOX, therefore, the power 
and perceived importance of CEOs with financial backgrounds was likely enhanced.   
 
 
Insiders with a particularly unique set of skills or knowledge may increase the relative 
dependence that other board members have for them, particularly when those skills are in an area 
critical to the firm (Hickson, et al., 1971).  This suggests that the introduction of SOX within 
organizations’  institutional  environments  likely  engendered  shifts  in  the  political  dynamics  
within boards, augmenting the power of CEOs with financial backgrounds. CEOs with financial 
expertise likely leveraged their increased power, influencing their companies to adopt board 
structures that best promoted their interests.  Thus, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: In the post SOX-period, CEOs with financial backgrounds will increase the 
likelihood of adopting the CEO-only structure. 
While structural elaboration theory has singularly focused on elaboration opportunities 
occurring at the institutional (and specifically formal, or regulatory) level, we suggest that 
elaboration opportunities also occur at the firm level.  Recent theoretical developments in the 
institutional logics perspective support this view, as situational contingencies activate highly 
accessible institutional logics, in this case the shareholder value logic, and facilitate change in 
organizing practices (Thornton et. al. 2012). Particular organizational contingencies can become 
elaboration opportunities when they provide powerful elites with a window within which to 
enact changes that reflect their own interests as well as the prevailing logic.   Such is the case 
when firm performance increases during the tenure of a particular CEO. 
Unlike structural dimensions of power like CEO duality or relative shareholdings that 
increase  a  CEO’s  power  by  directly  augmenting  their  control over board decisions, performance 
increases are not inherently a source of board power for CEOs.   However, positive changes in 
firm performance create an elaboration opportunity because a favorable change in performance is 
 
 
likely to draw attention to the CEO’s  success and increase the  board’s  evaluation  of  the  CEO’s  
effectiveness, thereby increasing the  CEO’s influence on new board initiatives. A CEO who is 
successful  at  improving  the  firm’s  performance will be viewed as having a firm grasp on current 
environmental demands and internal challenges.  In  these  situations,  the  CEO’s  solutions  to 
organizational problems, whether or not they are actually responsible for the performance 
increase, become highly valued by the board and gain credence with external monitors like 
industry analysts and the media (Hayward, Rindova and Pollock, 2004). Because  the  CEO’s  
interests, strategies and actions will be viewed as aligned with shareholders and in support of 
shareholder value, the board is likely to grant greater discretion to the CEO in shaping board 
decisions (including that of board membership). Note that at  the  time  of  IBM’s  transition  to  
CEO-only discussed above, Gerstner was well into a successful turnaround effort to cut billions 
in expenses and raise cash by selling assets.   Thus, performance increases generate opportunities 
for CEOs to mobilize power over board members and affect changes consistent with their 
interests.  
This notion receives additional support within corporate governance research, where 
evidence suggests that performance plays a significant role in processes of structural change 
(Cannella  &  Shen,  2001;;  Finkelstein  &  D’Aveni,  1994).    Illustratively,  Cannella  and  Shen  
(2001) documented that powerful CEOs are more likely to remove potential rivals when their 
firms perform well. While their study focused on heirs apparent, this effect is likely to generalize 
to independent majority structures where the CEO would be empowered by being the only 
insider on the board.  For powerful CEOs, positive changes in firm performance provide 
 
 
opportunities to adopt structures consistent with both their interests and prevailing institutional 
logics.  Thus we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4:  The greater the increase in firm performance, the greater the effect of 
CEO power on the likelihood of adoption of CEO-only structures.  
 
METHODS 
Sample and Data Collection 
This study uses an event history design to examine the adoption of the CEO-only insider 
structure. The population for this study includes the largest U.S. firms, as listed in the 1995 
Fortune 250. We chose this year because it is the first year that Fortune magazine included both 
industrial and service companies in its listings. Given the lack of financial data for 28 of the 
companies in the original sample, the sample was reduced to 222 companies. T-tests on the 
initial and final samples indicated no significant differences in size, measured as log of sales.  
Our unit of observation is the company-year for every company in the population 
covering the years 1981-2007.  Prior research suggests that during this period corporate 
governance -- and board structure in particular -- rose to prominence as a key concern for 
corporate stakeholders and regulators in the U.S.  The timeframe covers three important periods: 
the rise of the institutional investors during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Davis & Thompson, 
1994), the scandalous collapses of Enron and Worldcom during 2001, and the following shift in 
the regulatory environment engendered by the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley. Some firms were 
founded or became publicly held after 1981 and many merged or otherwise ceased to be publicly 
held companies prior to 2007. The methodology treats any spells ending prior to 2007 as right 
 
 
censored at that point. Data on insiders and the board of directors were obtained from the 
Standard  and  Poor’s  Register  of  Corporations,  Directors and Executives, Who’s  Who  in  Finance  
and Industry and corporate proxy statements. Revenue, employee data, and other financials were 
obtained from COMPUSTAT.   All independent variables and controls are lagged.  Because of 
this lag, we omitted all years in the data in which succession occurred so that the variables we 
use to capture CEO power would always reflect the sitting CEO at each firm, rather than the 
prior CEO.  The final sample includes a total of 2,918 firm-years. 
Dependent Variable 
To analyze the likelihood of a transition to CEO-only insider status, we created a 
dichotomous  variable,  coded  as  “1”  in  a  given  year  if  the  number  of  inside  directors  decreased  
from  two  or  more  insiders  to  only  one  insider  (the  CEO)  and  “0”  otherwise.  Transitions to the 
CEO-only insider structure were considered from 1981-2007, and were coded from Standard 
and  Poor’s  Register  of  Corporations,  Directors  and  Executives  based  on  the  publication’s  
indication of insider status. Family members, for our purposes, were also considered insiders.  
Firms are at risk of adopting the CEO-only structure only if they have at least one insider on the 
board in addition to the CEO for at least one year. In our analysis, we sought to distinguish 
between short-term CEO-only structures and longer-term shifts that demonstrated an effort to 
create a permanent CEO-only structure.  Therefore, to avoid short-term perturbations in board 
structure, we only considered a firm as having a CEO-only structure if it lasted for more than two 
years.  Two years provides ample time for boards to re-appoint insiders (if they are so inclined) 
and sensitivity analysis suggests that three and four year durations do not substantially change 
the findings.  In total, 144 events were observed within the 2,918 company-years of data in the 
 
 
sample.   Figure 1 shows the percentage of firms in the Fortune 250 that had the CEO-only 
structure over the duration of the study.  Whereas only around 5% of firms had the firm in the 
first year of our panel, over half of firms possessed the structure by the last end of the panel.   
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Independent Variables 
Proportion of insiders appointed before the CEO.  To test our first hypothesis we 
include a control for the proportion of inside directors other than the CEO who obtained their 
board  seats  at  any  time  prior  to  the  current  CEO’s  arrival.     
CEO power.  We utilize three measures of CEO power to assess the effects of CEO 
power on the creation of the CEO-only board. This is consistent with prior suggestions that CEO 
power is multidimensional.  For example, Finkelstein (1992) developed and validated a set of 
four dimensions of CEO power based on a variety of factors such as hierarchical position, stock 
ownership and functional expertise.  A number of subsequent studies have utilized derivatives or 
subsets of the Finkelstein power measures to explore a host of outcomes (e.g. Cannella & Shen, 
2001,Bigley & Wiersama, 2002).  We follow Finkelstein and colleagues and utilize three of his 
key measures of CEO power: functional background, duality, and stock ownership.   We do not 
rely on CEO tenure as a measure of power because of the confounding effects of impending 
succession.    As  a  CEO’s  tenure  increases,  boards  are  more  likely  to  add  inside  directors  as  heir  
apparent to the CEO (Vancil, 1987; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998; Shen & Cannella, 2001).  
However,  we  do  control  separately  for  a  CEO’s  relative  tenure,  as  described below. 
CEO duality is  included  as  a  binary  variable,  coded  “1”  if  a  CEO  is  also  the  board  
chairman.  This is one of the most widely used measures of CEO power (Wade et al., 1990), 
 
 
argued  to  increase  the  CEO’s  ability  to  control  board  agendas    (Finkelstein & D’Aveni,  1994)  
and afford the CEO unity of command in complex environments (Boyd, 1995). 
High levels of CEO stock ownership directly afford CEOs power through enhanced voting rights 
(Zald, 1969).  Because stock is also an important source of power for directors (Zajac & 
Westphal, 1995), we use a relative measure of CEO stock ownership, calculated as the number of 
outstanding shares held by the CEO divided by the total number of outstanding shares held by all 
board members.  CEO finance background was determined using the Forbes annual 
compensation survey.  Given that financial expertise is particularly critical for evaluation of firm 
performance, we expect CEOs with financial backgrounds to be more likely to mobilize their 
power to secure a CEO-only structure.  We  created  a  binary  variable  that  was  coded  “1”  if  a  CEO  
had a background in finance.   
Sarbanes Oxley and its elaboration.  We incorporate a period effect for Sarbanes Oxley 
(SOX) in the model.  The SOX variable  is  binary,  coded  “1”  for  the  years  2003  and  after,  after  
the law went into force.  To test the elaboration of SOX we include a variable interacting the 
SOX variable with whether the CEO has financial expertise. 
Change in performance and its elaboration.  To test Hypothesis 4, we include a variable 
capturing change in performance,  which  is  coded  as  the  difference  in  the  firm’s  industry-
adjusted return-on-assets in the two prior years.  We include interactions between this variable 
and each of our three power indicators. 
Control Variables 
Alternative sources of board influence  
 
 
We include four separate variables to control for separate factors that might affect the 
CEO’s  relationship  with  other  members  of  the  board.      First,  we  control  for  relative CEO tenure, 
measured as the ratio of the number of years the CEO has held their title divided by the average 
number of years that other directors have held their board seats.  Second, we include a binary 
variable to control for firms in which the CEO is also the  firm’s  founder, as founders may have a 
different relationship to board insiders than other CEOs.  This is a binary variable that is coded 
“1”  if  the  CEO  founded  the  organization  and  “0”  otherwise.    And  third,  we  include  a  control  for  
CEO age, as CEOs approaching retirement may cede some decision-making control to other 
members of the board.  Finally, to account for changes in  a  CEO’s  power  concomitant  with  
board structural changes, we include a binary control for change in duality,  coded  as  “1”  in  any  
year in which a company that had had a separate Chairman gave its CEO that title.   
Larger  boards  might  have  more  “room”  for  both  insiders  and  outsiders,  potentially  
making it more difficult to adopt the CEO-only structure.   Board size was calculated as the total 
number of board members.  Additionally, we include a control for the percentage of insiders on 
the board.  This variable, measured as the ratio of the number of insiders to the total number of 
board members, accounts for the difficulty of eliminating a large proportion of board members in 
one year.  We also control for the number of insider departures at the firm, equal to the number 
of board insiders who left the company in the prior firm-year.  This measure accommodates a 
host of voluntary and involuntary reasons that an insider may leave the firm – including, for 
example, herding behavior following a CEO succession – and thus accounts for sources of 
unobserved heterogeneity in changes to board structure. We also include a binary variable to 
indicate all boards with a classified board structure.  A classified board is one where only a 
 
 
fraction of board members are up for renewal in any given year, preventing a wholesale 
departure of insiders.   
The power of outsiders has been shown to constrain CEO behavior and improve the 
board’s  alignment  with  the  interests  of  shareholders.  However,  outsiders  also  have  a  
responsibility to provide advice and counsel to the CEO in decision making (Westphal, 1999) 
and may benefit in this endeavor from the presence of other insiders.  Although we do not 
hypothesize an effect for outsider power, we suspect that these two competing interests -- that of 
monitoring and counsel -- could leave outsiders somewhat indifferent to structural change.  We 
utilize two measures of outsider power.  First, because outsiders who are recruited by the CEO 
may be less likely to stand up to the CEO than outsiders who predate the CEO, we include a 
control for the percentage of outsiders appointed by the CEO.   Second, we include percentage 
of outsider stock ownership, coded as the number of shares held by the outside members of the 
board divided by the shares held by all board members.   
Institutional investors are also a strong force in corporate governance (Davis & 
Thompson, 1994; Useem, 1996).  Institutional investors seek to increase outsider representation 
on the board (Johnson & Greening, 1999), and is therefore likely that, institutional investors will 
support moves to eliminate insiders from the board.   The influence and activism of institutional 
investors  is  likely  to  increase  when  they  hold  a  substantial  amount  of  a  company’s  shares.    
Therefore, to estimate the impact of institutional investors on board structural change, we include 
a measure – blockholders -- that  captures  the  total  percentage  of  each  firm’s  shares  held  by  all  
institutional  investors  that  hold  a  minimum  of  a  5%  block  of  the  company’s  shares.     
Firm-specific controls 
 
 
We include controls for several firm-level explanations of board-structural change.  We 
controlled for the level of performance using industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) because it 
has been demonstrated to impact various dimensions of board changes (Shen & Cannella, 2002).  
To control for the potential relationship between board structural change and managerial strategy 
and discretion, we include controls for firm size, in terms of logged assets and logged sales; firm 
age in years; resource availability in terms of cash on hand; and financial leverage in terms of 
debt-to-equity (Finkelstein & D’Aveni  1994;;  Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987).  We examined firm 
histories to account for previous CEO-only insider events, and recorded the number of times the 
CEO-insider only structure had been previously adopted at the firm.  We also included a control 
for each firm’s   age, in years. And finally, we controlled for potential industry effects by 
including fixed effects for each SIC major industry division represented in the sample.  Summary 
statistics and bivariate correlations of all dependent and independent variables are shown in 
Table 1, below. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Analysis and Results 
The analysis was conducted using a discrete-time event history analysis (Allison, 1984).   
Though directors may rarely be replaced due to death or unforeseen events at other times in a 
year, firms typically experience board changes once a year at their annual meeting when 
shareholders vote on a slate of directors.  In light of this, our model uses calendar year as the 
time clock, with discrete time measures calculated for each calendar year.  Given that firms 
typically experience board change at their annual meetings, all firms that change to the CEO-
only  structure  in  the  same  year  are  treated  in  the  model  as  ‘ties,’  meaning  that  they  are  coded  as  
 
 
experiencing the event at the same time, irrespective of when in the year they actually adopted 
the structure.  This aspect of our data drove our decision to employ the discrete time event 
history model because it is capable of modeling ties, unlike continuous-time models -- such as 
the Cox model -- that are unable to handle multiple, co-occurring events (Arjas and Kangas, 
1992; Yamaguchi, 1991). Given that some firms in our sample were at risk of transitioning to the 
CEO-only structure more than once (if they again brought in additional inside directors after two 
years of having the CEO-only structure), we treated the measure as a repeatable event (Boeker, 
1992; Zajac and Wesphal, 1996).    
The results of the event history analysis of changes in board structure are displayed in 
Table 2.  We ran the models using both a simple probit and simple logit approach.  We obtained 
similar results using both approaches, but the probit approach yielded a lower BIC statistic, 
suggesting that it was a better fit for our models.  Thus, the results from the probit models are 
shown below. 
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
We tested our hypotheses using a series of nested models.  Model 1 includes only control 
variables.  Model 2 introduces the percentage of insiders appointed before the CEO in order to 
test hypothesis 1.  Model 3 tests hypothesis 2 by introducing variables to capture executive 
power.  In model 4, we test hypothesis 3 by introducing the SOX variable and its interaction with 
CEOs with a finance background.  Finally, in model 5, we test hypothesis 4 by introducing the 
change in performance variable and its interactions with executive power.    
The results for the control variables are consistent in each of the models.   We do not find 
evidence that block-holding institutional investors have a significant effect on the adoption of the 
 
 
CEO-only structure.    Of course, our findings do not preclude the possibility that institutional 
investors may push for greater board independence.  They just may not work toward the 
“extreme”  case  of  the  CEO-only insider structure.  We also find no effects for firm-level 
variables such as industry adjusted ROA, log of sales, firm age, debt-to-equity, or number of 
previous CEO-only events.    We do find that board size is negatively associated with the event, 
suggesting that boards with more seats to fill are more likely to keep other insiders on the board.  
This is an especially interesting finding in light of larger trends toward shrinking board sizes.  
Figure 2 shows the average board size and insider/outsider ratio for the firms in our sample over 
the duration of the panel.  As the figure suggests, board sizes decreased about 13% during the 
panel, but the average number of outsiders on boards remained fairly steady over this period.   
The trend toward smaller boards seems to be primarily explained by a near-50% decrease in the 
average number of board insiders.  Thus, whereas our results suggest that larger boards are less 
likely to have the CEO-only structure, if boards continue to shrink we would expect to see the 
structure continue to increase in prevalence. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
We do not find evidence of any significant relationship between classified board 
structures and the event. The control for the percentage of insiders on the board was negative and 
significant, which suggests that when the board is populated by a large percentage of insiders, it 
may simply be too difficult to remove all of the insiders in a short period of time.    However, the 
control for the number of insider departures is positive and significant, which suggests that 
insiders may leave in waves: once some insiders leave the board, it becomes more likely that the 
firm will remove all of its remaining insiders in the following year.   
 
 
We  did  not  find  any  significant  relationship  between  a  CEO’s  tenure  relative  to  the  board  
and the structure.  However, we do find that as CEOs age the CEO-only structure becomes less 
likely, perhaps due to the increased likelihood of the presence of an internal heir apparent.  The 
control for the percentage of outsiders appointed by the CEO is positive and significant across 
models 2-5.  CEOs may have more power over directors that have been awarded board seats 
under their watch, so this finding is consistent with our argument that powerful CEOs press for 
adoption of the CEO-only structure. 
The control we included for change in CEO/Chairman duality was positive and 
significant across all models.  This suggests that adoption of the CEO-only structure is more 
likely to occur along with a concomitant event that necessitates changing the structure of the 
board.   Board members may be more open to adoption of the new structure when they are 
already involved in a task that requires changing the roles or members of the board. And finally, 
the number of firms that have adopted the CEO-only structure has a positive association with a 
firm’s  likelihood of adopting the structure that is near to significance in models 1, 3, and 5.  This 
provides some evidence that mimetic pressures encourage firms to adopt the CEO-only structure. 
We now turn to our hypotheses.  Overall, the results in models 2-5 provide strong support 
for hypothesis 1, on CEO interests. Consistent with hypothesis 1, boards with a larger percentage 
of inside directors who predate the CEO are more likely to adopt the CEO-only insider structure 
(p<.001).  CEOs may not feel as advantaged by inside directors who they themselves did not 
propose to the board.   
Hypothesis 2 receives support in models 3-5, for some determinants of CEO power, but 
not all.  CEO duality has a positive and significant relationship with the adoption of the structure 
 
 
across models 3-5 (p<.01). We do not find evidence, however, that  a  CEO’s  relative  share  
holdings or finance background has a significant main effect on the likelihood of the structure.  
The results indicate that the agenda control concomitant to duality may give these CEOs more 
leverage in altering board structure and composition, but other forms of CEO power do not have 
the same effects.  For the case of finance CEOs, their power may be less than we hypothesized 
(cf., Ocasio & Kim, 1999). 
Hypotheses 3, involving Sarbanes Oxley and its elaboration by CEOs with finance 
backgrounds, received support in Models 4 and 5. As hypothesized, the interaction between SOX 
and CEO finance background is positive and significant (p<.05), indicating that the CEO-only 
structure was more likely after SOX in boards led by CEOs with financial expertise.   SOX has a 
marginally significant negative association with the structures. The main effect of the CEO with 
a finance background is not significant, suggesting that SOX served as an elaboration 
opportunity for finance CEOs.   The interaction effect is graphically demonstrated in Figure 3, 
below.  The strongest predictor of adoption of the CEO-only structure is the percentage of 
insiders on the board in the prior year.  There is a very low probability of the structure being 
adopted when the percentage of insiders is at its mean of roughly 25% of the board.  However, as 
the proportion of insiders drops below the mean, the conditional probability of the CEO-only 
structure increases dramatically and the interactions we explore here become important 
predictors of when the structure is likely to occur.  This suggests that the elaboration mechanisms 
we propose become most important when there are already relatively few insiders on the board.  
Thus, in the figure below, we have held the percentage of insiders at one standard deviation 
below the mean (roughly 13%).  All other control variables are held at their mean.  As can be 
 
 
seen in the figure, the predicted likelihood of adoption of the CEO-only structure was similar (at 
around a 4% probability) regardless of whether a CEO had a finance background before SOX, 
but firms that have CEOs with finance backgrounds are about ten times more likely to adopt the 
structure after SOX than firms that have CEOs with no finance background. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
We also receive support for hypothesis 4, for two of the three measures of power, which 
suggests that powerful CEOs can leverage outperformance to press for adoption of the CEO-only 
structure.  The main effect of change in performance is not significant, nor is its interaction with 
CEOs with a finance background.  However, we do find significant and positive interactions 
between changes in performance and both CEO duality (p<.05) and  CEOs’  relative  
shareholdings (p<.01).  These interactions are depicted in Figures 4 and 5, below.  Again, the 
percentage of insiders is held at one standard deviation below the mean in these figures and all 
other controls are held at their mean.  Figure 4 shows that firms with dual CEO/Chairman 
become more likely to adopt the structure as their change in performance improves, but those 
with a separate CEO and Chairman become less likely to adopt the structure as performance 
improves.  Figure 5 suggests that for firms where industry-adjusted ROA has increased by 1 over 
the prior year, there is an almost 15% probability of the structure occurring in boards where 
CEOs  hold  75%  of  the  board’s  total  shares, which is around four times more likely than in firms 
where  the  CEO  holds  25%  of  the  board’s  total  shares. 
[Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here] 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
In this paper, we explore the proliferation of a paradoxical phenomenon in corporate 
governance, the CEO-only board structure, where the CEO is the only insider on the board.  The 
structure has spread without much notice or remark because it appears to neatly accord with the 
director independence mandate derived from agency theory and the logic of shareholder value.  
However, a growing body of evidence in management research and finance suggests that the 
CEO-only structure may in fact enhance the power and entrenchment of CEOs, leading to 
monitoring inefficiencies (Liu & Jiraporn, 2008), increased managerial excess (Zorn, Shropshire, 
Martin & Combs, 2013) and greater CEO influence (Adams et al, 2005).  This evidence sparks 
our overarching research question: why do structures proliferate that appear to align with the 
objectives of a dominant institutional logic, but that work in practice to contravene those 
objectives? 
To answer this question, we propose that the CEO-only structure exemplifies the 
phenomenon of structural elaboration, originally developed in the context of coercive 
institutional change, and extended here to apply to changes in institutional logics.  Structural 
elaboration theory (Edelman, 1992) contends that organizations strategically respond to 
ambiguous institutional demands by adopting structures that appear to conform, but that work in 
reality to enhance executive interests.  While the CEO-only structure is an elaborated form of 
board independence, a mandate derived from agency theory and the logic of shareholder value, 
we argue that the structure  enhances  the  CEO’s  interests  by  proffering  an  information  brokerage  
position and removing potential internal challengers.   
Having identified the CEO-only structure as an example of structural elaboration, we 
explore the proliferation of the structure as an opportunity to construct and test a more precise 
 
 
theoretical model of the mechanisms that drive processes of structural elaboration: executive 
interests, executive power, and elaboration opportunities.  Our basic premise is that CEO 
interests and power have a direct effect on what structural changes are made in response to 
pressures from new institutional logics.  Specifically, we contend that the structures that 
proliferate in response to new logics will be consistent with the interests of powerful 
organizational executives, in our case the CEO.  Executive power is not, however, monolithic, 
but is moderated by institutional events and organizational contingencies.  In light of this, we 
propose that the timing of the adoption of new structures will be shaped by institutional events 
(like the passage of Sarbanes Oxley) or organizational contingencies (like increases in 
performance). Each of these examples of elaboration opportunities spark power mobilization and 
increase the likelihood that structures will be altered in ways that accord with the interests of 
powerful executives as well as the expectations of prevailing logics.  
The present study has several limitations. First, our sample includes only the largest U.S. 
public corporations. Small, family-owned or otherwise private organizations may have different 
political dynamics, particularly when a founding family member is present.  Second, given the 
many multi-divisional firms in our sample, finance backgrounds may be particularly important 
because of their usefulness in devising acquisition and diversification strategies (Song, 1982; 
Palmer & Barber, 2001). Consequently, our indicators of financial expertise may be less 
applicable to other contexts. Third, like other large sample studies of boards of directors, this 
study does not directly observe the political processes by which power is exercised or mobilized 
(Pettigrew, 1992; Zajac & Westphal, 1996).  
 
 
Our focus on the interests of powerful executives, in particular, highlights an important 
assumption in our model: that CEOs perceive CEO-only boards as being in their own self-
interest.  Although we cannot directly test this relationship, as interests are inherently 
unobservable, it is a view shared by financial economists and organizational scholars that is 
informed by a growing body of empirical evidence that this structure advantages CEOs (e.g. 
Adams et al, 2005; Liu & Jiraporn, 2008; Hoechle, Schmid, Walter& Yermak, 2012; Zorn et al., 
2013).  Moreover, model-theoretic approaches to social inquiry suggest that constructs like “self-
interests”  provide useful guidance on the nature of expected relationships even when they do not 
lead to directly testable hypotheses (Harris, Johnson and Souder, 2013).2  Indeed, the agency 
theoretic expectation that CEOs prefer to have insiders on their board because they expect 
insiders to be less diligent monitors has, to our knowledge, never been tested directly, but has 
been similarly employed as a springboard to testable hypotheses. Our assumption that CEOs 
prefer the CEO-only structure to alternate forms of independent-majority structures, which is 
grounded in a rich literature on socio-political processes on corporate boards (Zajac & Westphal, 
1996), recognizes that the proposed associations will not hold under all conditions (Tsang and 
Kwan, 1999), but still demonstrates an empirical regularity that informs and refines our 
scholarship on models of board structural change.   
                                                        
2 Along these lines, realists in the philosophy of social science (e.g. Bhaskar, 1975; Godfrey and Hill, 1985) argue 
that testing theory for its veracity should not require the measurement of observable variables. Many  “real”  
mechanisms are not directly observable but are, nevertheless, essential for understanding causal forces.  In 
organizational and strategy research, examples include divergent interests in agency theory, tacit resources in the 
resource based view, and perceived opportunism in transaction costs economics.  
 
 
Our study offers several contributions to the literature.  First, we extend structural 
elaboration theory to the domain of corporate governance, using the theory to explain why firms 
adopt governance structures that ostensibly accord with the expectations of a dominant 
institutional  logic,  but  in  actuality  diverge  from  the  logic’s  underlying  principles.   While 
Edelman applied structural elaboration to ambiguous changes in the law, we suggest that the 
theory can also be applied to understand organizational responses to ambiguous prescriptions of 
institutional logics. In so doing, we introduce structural elaboration as a lens to explain variation 
in the way institutional logics are instantiated inside organizations.  Moreover, we augment 
structural elaboration theory by drawing from the socio-political perspective on corporate 
governance.    Whereas  Edelman’s  (1992)  account  focuses  more  on  inter-organizational political 
dynamics, we focus on the intra-organizational political dynamics at the board level board that 
drive the elaboration of institutional logics.  We argue and demonstrate that board structural 
change is shaped by the interest of powerful players in the organization (in particular, the CEO) 
as well as the opportunities to elaborate practices.  By merging structural elaboration theory with 
the socio-political perspective, a breed of theoretical contribution Harris et al. (2013) recently 
referred  to  as  “grafting,”  we  are able to provide a more nuanced and precise theoretical model of 
how structural elaboration proceeds in practice.  
We also add to the institutional logics literature by examining the role of structural 
elaboration in shaping the way institutional logics are realized inside organizations.  Our focus 
on power, interests and opportunities as links between logics and agency, captures more fully 
how key organizational actors shape choices concerning the adoption and variation of practices 
and structures that reinforce existing logics. (Thornton et al, 2012).  More generally, by focusing 
 
 
on the role of executive power and political opportunities undergirding structural elaboration, our 
theory answers the call for more attention to the micro-foundations of institutions (Thornton et 
al., 2012; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Zucker, 1991).  Locally-constructed conceptions of 
institutions,  such  as  Hallett  &  Ventresca’s  (2006)  theory  of  ‘inhabited  institutions’  or  Thornton  et  
al’s  (2012)  conception  of  negotiated  order  stress  that  institutions actually arise in the interaction 
between macro-level pressures and organization-level contingencies.  These middle-range 
conceptions of institutions suggest that institutional myths are not merely handed down as rigid 
mandates  or  ‘iron  cages’  (DiMaggio  & Powell, 1983), but are interpreted among actors seeking 
to appropriately respond to institutional expectations (Hallett, 2010).  Our study augments this 
work and demonstrates the potential for practice variation and unintended contradictions 
between the underlying theoretical principles of agency theory and shareholder value 
maximization and the practices of the shareholder value logic.  This incremental structural 
change has the potential to generate internal contradictions in the shareholder value logic, which 
could result in subsequent changes in the logic (Seo & Creed, 2002). Our concept of elaboration 
opportunities is similar to what has previously been referred to as choice opportunities (March & 
Olsen’s,  1976),  policy  windows  (Kingdon,  1984)  and  windows of opportunity (Tyre & 
Orlikowski, 1994).  It reflects a situated view of decision making which emphasizes the 
influence of situational characteristics on the critical issues and solutions that constitute the 
decision makers focus of attention (Ocasio, 1997). The concept of elaboration opportunity builds 
on related approaches by recognizing that opportunities for change are influenced simultaneously 
by institutional logics, decision-making situations and individual interests.   Institutional and 
organizational events generate the attention of actors who have distinct preferences and 
 
 
capacities for influencing structural changes (Nigam & Ocasio, 2010). Thus, structural change 
occurs in part because logics and more proximate influences provide social actors with impetus 
and motivation for elaboration and development of the extant logic. 
At the same time, the concept of elaboration opportunity recognizes that power cannot be 
exerted under all conditions (March, 1966; Kingdon, 1984).   Consequently, some elaboration 
opportunities  offer  better  timing  to  assert  a  policy  change  than  others.    Since,  the  CEO’s  efforts  
to  exert  power  are  partly  context  dependent,  the  probability  of  the  CEO’s  political  activity  
increases with the presence of particular elaboration opportunities.  The CEO, as an experienced 
political player (Vancil, 1987), will have a sense for whether the organizational context is 
favorable for political activity which supports their position and status.    
This is consistent with the adoption patterns evident in our data.   The adoption pattern of 
the CEO-only structure was uneven, and it was not marked by a watershed event. It evolved 
rather quietly and incrementally over time.  Few firms (11) in our sample adopted the structure in 
the 1980s.  Of those firms that had the structure at the start of our analysis – Coca-Cola, 
Conagra, Consolidated Freightways, Digital Equipment, Entergy, Northwest Airlines, Norwest 
and Weyerhauser – only Digital Equipment and Entergy had the structure at founding.  Digital 
was led by its co-founder Kenneth Olsen and Entergy was controlled by utility regulators who 
could set the rate of return for shareholders and limit managerial discretion (Demsetz, 1983). 
Most firms (69) adopted the structure in the 1990s, including IBM, which serves as a canonical 
example of our model.  At the time of the transition to a CEO-only board, Gerstner held both the 
Chair and CEO positions and owned 473,333 shares at the time of transition to CEO-only which 
was 93.6% of total shares held by board members.   He was also only three years into his twelve-
 
 
year tenure, but was leading a successful turnaround.  Gerstner had control of the board agenda 
and his  firm’s  superior  performance  provided  an organizational opportunity to make changes.   
This focus on opportunities may be a fruitful one for future researchers and additional 
work is needed to identify the role of decision opportunities in shaping power activation in other 
contexts and how they affect the elaboration of other structures and processes.  Although not a 
focus of the present study, the historical trajectory of the CEO-only board structure does suggest 
that the individual agency of structural elaboration has the potential for change – or at least 
refinement - of the extant logic.  More studies are needed to understand the role of elaboration in 
the development and transformation of institutional logics, and the endogenous process of 
institutional change more generally.  In all, the elusive and recursive link between institutional 
and organizational change is an important one, and hopefully our study provides insights into 
one part of that process in articulating a concrete link between changes in the institutional 
environment and structural elaboration at the organizational level – of which board structure is 
but one example. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper explores the structural elaboration of organizational logics in the context of 
corporate governance. We began our paper by noting a paradox: the adoption of the CEO-only 
structure appears to conform to agency theory and shareholder value logics, but prior analyses of 
its empirical effects suggest that it works in practice to enrich and entrench the CEO, contrary to 
the shareholder value logic’s  ultimate  objective.    We resolve this paradox by finding evidence 
that while the principles of the shareholder value logic are apparently upheld by the adoption of 
 
 
the CEO-only structure, this structure in actuality is favored by powerful CEOs, and more so 
when it serves to remove insiders not explicitly beholden to the CEO for their board positions.  
Our application of structural elaboration theory to corporate governance reminds us that 
institutional logics are inherently ambiguous, and that the application of their principles may not 
always serve their desired purposes, but instead serve the interests of powerful elites. Board 
independence is a taken-for-granted feature of the shareholder value logic, and supermajority 
outsider boards an established desiderata. Yet with the adoption of CEO-only boards, powerful 
CEOs  embrace  a  structure  that  conforms  to  the  principle  of  “board  independence,”  albeit  one  that  
research has shown to facilitate the opposite, greater CEO entrenchment.   
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Figure 1.  Percentage of sample with CEO-only structure
 
 
Figure 2.  Changes in board structure: 1981 - 2008
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Figure 3.  Predicted Probability of the CEO-Only Structure, Demonstrating the Interaction 
of Sarbanes Oxley and CEOs with a Finance Background 
 
Figure 4.  Predicted Probability of the CEO-Only Structure, Demonstrating the Interaction 
of Change in Performance and CEO Duality 
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Figure 5.  Predicted Probability of the CEO-Only Structure, Demonstrating the Interaction 
of  Change  in  Performance  and  CEO’s  Relative  Shares 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Table  
 
Table continued on next page   
Name Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5
1 CEO-Only Event 0.043 0.20 0.00 1.00 1.000
2 CEO Duality 0.781 0.41 0.00 1.00 -0.080 1.000
3 CEO Relative Shares 0.263 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.064 0.143 1.000
4 CEO is Founder 0.042 0.20 0.00 1.00 -0.009 0.034 0.197 1.000
5 CEO Finance Background 0.238 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.021 -0.040 -0.028 -0.059 1.000
6 % Insiders Predating CEO 0.638 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.163 -0.221 -0.178 -0.195 -0.020
7 Sarbanes Oxley 0.099 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.103 -0.123 0.067 -0.048 -0.026
8 Change in Performance 0.005 0.66 -9.51 9.09 0.041 -0.009 0.008 -0.005 0.016
9 CEO Relative Tenure 0.859 0.87 0.00 6.46 -0.065 0.227 0.192 0.267 0.000
10 % Outsiders Appt. by CEO 0.376 0.35 0.00 1.00 -0.072 0.229 0.213 0.261 -0.003
11 CEO Age 56.682 6.60 33.00 92.00 -0.075 0.214 0.084 -0.005 0.003
12 Logged Assets 9.358 1.40 4.22 14.60 0.059 0.014 -0.027 -0.193 0.288
13 % Board Shares Held by Outsiders 0.307 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.005 -0.037 -0.367 -0.132 0.047
14 Cash 1223.876 3291.44 -150.17 40412.00 0.053 -0.017 -0.010 -0.065 0.208
15 DebttoEquity 6769.244 28169.98 0.00 486876.00 0.018 -0.012 -0.001 -0.043 0.056
16 Classified Board 0.528 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.000 0.071 0.043 0.035 -0.087
17 Board Size 14.133 3.91 2.00 43.00 -0.078 0.077 -0.187 -0.145 0.210
18 Percentage Insiders on Board 0.259 0.12 0.07 1.00 -0.124 -0.166 -0.070 0.117 -0.115
19 Change in Duality 0.059 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.231 -0.486 -0.069 -0.025 -0.008
20 Insider Departures 0.108 0.39 0.00 5.00 0.063 -0.005 -0.007 -0.003 -0.028
21 # Other Firms with Structure 39.692 22.82 11.00 87.00 0.157 -0.130 0.133 -0.099 -0.032
22 Industry Adjusted ROA 0.168 0.57 -3.46 9.56 0.047 -0.036 0.029 -0.018 -0.069
23 Logged Sales 9.105 0.99 2.52 12.75 0.057 0.006 0.010 -0.217 -0.008
24 Firm Age 77.221 42.43 -15.00 197.00 0.040 0.088 -0.016 -0.261 0.072
25 Prior CEO-Only Events 0.096 0.32 0.00 3.00 0.116 -0.068 0.029 -0.063 0.006
26 Blockholders 2.452 8.00 0.00 99.72 0.036 -0.046 0.020 -0.024 -0.005
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
6 % Insiders Predating CEO 1.000
7 Sarbanes Oxley 0.051 1.000
8 Change in Performance 0.020 -0.016 1.000
9 CEO Relative Tenure -0.504 -0.041 -0.018 1.000
10 % Outsiders Appt. by CEO -0.490 -0.053 -0.029 0.831 1.000
11 CEO Age -0.279 -0.010 0.006 0.265 0.217 1.000
12 Logged Assets 0.038 0.238 0.006 -0.112 -0.108 0.107 1.000
13 % Board Shares Held by Outsiders 0.087 0.062 -0.002 -0.144 -0.133 -0.036 0.062 1.000
14 Cash 0.002 0.253 -0.010 -0.036 -0.042 -0.007 0.569 0.059 1.000
15 DebttoEquity 0.019 0.188 0.000 -0.018 -0.019 -0.022 0.424 -0.029 0.370
16 Classified Board -0.019 -0.054 0.003 0.053 0.057 0.019 -0.225 -0.049 -0.168
17 Board Size -0.015 -0.104 -0.002 -0.017 -0.012 0.103 0.344 0.168 0.182
18 Percentage Insiders on Board -0.009 -0.125 -0.011 0.125 0.121 -0.015 -0.285 -0.234 -0.167
19 Change in Duality 0.082 0.047 0.013 -0.149 -0.172 -0.075 0.014 0.028 0.039
20 Insider Departures 0.026 -0.010 0.012 -0.002 0.001 0.014 0.009 0.013 0.011
21 # Other Firms with Structure 0.074 0.583 0.021 -0.052 -0.077 0.035 0.422 -0.051 0.275
22 Industry Adjusted ROA 0.019 0.083 0.599 -0.031 -0.026 -0.012 0.012 -0.022 0.006
23 Logged Sales 0.065 0.265 0.001 -0.126 -0.114 0.172 0.746 -0.006 0.383
24 Firm Age 0.077 0.104 0.002 -0.142 -0.151 0.083 0.193 0.033 0.147
25 Prior CEO-Only Events 0.028 0.293 -0.015 -0.062 -0.079 -0.041 0.117 0.048 0.032
26 Blockholders 0.010 -0.080 0.026 -0.005 -0.007 0.025 0.019 -0.017 -0.019
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
16 Classified Board -0.134 1.000
17 Board Size 0.080 -0.076 1.000
18 Percentage Insiders on Board -0.078 0.060 -0.223 1.000
19 Change in Duality 0.010 -0.019 0.007 0.016 1.000
20 Insider Departures 0.020 0.027 0.065 0.119 0.020 1.000
21 # Other Firms with Structure 0.213 -0.066 -0.199 -0.231 0.063 -0.013 1.000
22 Industry Adjusted ROA -0.017 0.027 -0.078 0.005 0.010 -0.007 0.157 1.000
23 Logged Sales 0.303 -0.107 0.172 -0.183 0.022 0.032 0.498 0.065 1.000
24 Firm Age 0.045 0.048 0.198 -0.130 0.020 -0.009 0.144 0.021 0.205 1.000
25 Prior CEO-Only Events 0.151 -0.039 -0.113 -0.148 0.051 -0.040 0.347 0.037 0.122 0.092 1.000
26 Blockholders -0.017 0.028 -0.102 -0.065 0.010 -0.014 0.220 0.043 0.077 -0.007 0.077
 
 
Table 2. Discrete Time Event History Analysis of the Likelihood of Adoption of the CEO-
only Structure 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
% Insiders Predating the CEO 1.871*** 1.994*** 2.024*** 2.055***
(0.33) (0.36) (0.37) (0.39)
CEO Duality 0.828*** 0.770** 0.741** 
(0.23) (0.24) (0.23)
CEO Relative Shares 0.311 0.297 0.256
(0.27) (0.28) (0.28)
CEO is Founder 0.275 0.278 0.324
(0.42) (0.43) (0.43)
CEO Finance Background 0.23 0.0447 0.0511
(0.16) (0.19) (0.19)
Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) -0.391+ -0.418+
(0.23) (0.24)
SOX x Finance Background 0.859* 0.838*  
(0.37) (0.39)
Δ  Performance -0.391** 
(0.14)
Δ  Perf.  x  Duality 0.510*  
(0.22)
Δ  Perf.  x  Relative  Shares 1.133** 
(0.38)
Δ  Perf.  x  Founder -0.584
(0.42)
Δ  Perf.  x  Fin.  Background 0.159
(0.17)
Controls
CEO Relative Tenure -0.325 0.243 0.122 0.0991 0.0855
(0.20) (0.20) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
% Outsiders Appointed 0.625 0.696 0.802+ 0.889* 0.972* 
By CEO (0.41) (0.42) (0.44) (0.44) (0.45)
CEO Age -0.0319** -0.0383** -0.0428*** -0.0412** -0.0432***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Logged Assets 0.137 0.0585 0.0596 0.0651 0.131
(0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
% Board Shares Held by -0.308+ -0.516* -0.359 -0.377 -0.358
Outsiders (0.19) (0.20) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24)
 
 
 
Table 2. Discrete Time Event History Analysis of the Likelihood of Adoption of the CEO-
only Structure (cont’d) 
 
Robust standard errors, clustered by firm, are in parentheses.  Fixed effects for industry by SIC major sector are 
included in the model but not shown here. 
+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Cash 1.61E-05 2.77E-05 3.37E-05* 3.76E-05* 3.84E-05*  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DebttoEquity -2.22E-06 -3.00E-06 -1.90E-06 -2.14E-06 -2.73E-06
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Classified Board 0.182 0.202 0.231 0.209 0.191
(0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Board Size -0.244*** -0.239*** -0.231*** -0.230*** -0.240***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
% Insiders on Board -14.78*** -15.61*** -15.57*** -15.58*** -16.21***
(2.41) (2.67) (2.81) (2.80) (2.42)
Change in Duality 1.755*** 1.965*** 2.660*** 2.610*** 2.629***
(0.17) (0.20) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
# Board Departures 0.895*** 0.949*** 0.930*** 0.948*** 0.999***
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14)
# Other Companies with 0.00600 0.00570 0.00738+ 0.00795 0.00859+
CEO-Only Structure (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Industry Adjusted ROA 0.0843 0.0623 0.0754 0.106 -0.242
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.22)
Logged Sales -0.113 0.0177 -0.0501 -0.0522 -0.113
(0.15) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18)
Firm Age 0.00214 0.00224 0.00141 0.00124 0.00122
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Prior CEO-Only Events 0.078 0.0658 0.132 0.0961 0.111
(0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
% Held by Blockholders -0.00987 -0.0111 -0.0111 -0.0108 -0.0113
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.261 -0.783 -0.838 -0.621 -0.213
(1.30) (1.45) (1.55) (1.51) (1.40)
Log Pseudolikelihood -281.62 -243.61 -235.18 -232.47 -227.71
Pseudo R^2 0.39 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.51
N 2918 2918 2918 2918 2918
